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We are nearing the quarter-century mark in the Supreme Court’s mis-
guided reinterpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).  The jurispru-
dence of mandatory arbitration1 grows out of a “Second Arbitration Trilogy”
decided in the early 1980s.2  In 1983, in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.
Mercury Construction Corp.,3 the Court announced its newly minted view that
the FAA created “a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, not-
withstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.”4  The
next year, in Southland Corp. v. Keating,5 the Court held that section 2 of the
FAA is substantive federal law that preempts state law purporting to regulate
arbitration agreements within the FAA’s purview.  And the next year, in Mit-
subishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,6 the Court overruled
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1
“Mandatory arbitration” refers to arbitration pursuant to an adhesive, pre-dispute arbitra-
tion agreement.  For further elaboration of these concepts and the surrounding arguments,
see, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration:  Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1631, 1631-32 & n.1 (2005).  I hereby abandon my effort to relabel the term “compelled
arbitration.” See David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business:
Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L.
REV. 33, 37 & n.10.
2 See Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy:  The Federalization of Arbitra-
tion Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305 (1985).  Professor Hirshman was one of the earliest academic
commentators to begin to recognize the long-term significance of these cases, by referring to
a “Second Arbitration Trilogy” of FAA cases to be compared in importance to the famous
labor arbitration trilogy. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564
(1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
3 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
4 Id. at 24.  In the years since, the first half of this phrase has been quoted in countless briefs
and judicial opinions, expanding an assertion about federal preemption into a broad endorse-
ment of arbitration as a preferred dispute resolution forum.
5 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
6 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
Hirshman’s article focused on the federalization of private arbitration implicit in Moses H.
Cone, Southland, and Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985). See
Hirshman, supra note 2.  With apologies to Professor Hirshman, I am identifying Mitsubishi
as the third case of the Trilogy:  To me, it has far greater importance than Dean Witter and
might well have been the third case in Hirshman’s trilogy had her article not gone to press
before Mitsubishi was announced.
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the “public policy exception” to enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agree-
ments, holding for the first time that a statute regulating one-sided transactions
could be subject to mandatory arbitration.7  Thus, by 1985, the Supreme Court
had made the two fundamental errors in FAA interpretation that plague us to
this day:  (1) the FAA’s preemption of state law, and (2) the right of stronger
parties in regulated transactions to compel arbitration as a condition of doing
business.  Everything that troubles critics of mandatory arbitration—every-
thing—arises out of these two errors.
In this Article, I argue for congressional action to overrule the Second
Trilogy through an overhaul of the FAA.  The most compelling reasons for
overruling the Second Trilogy arise from the unfairness of the FAA regime of
mandatory arbitration compared to preserving a litigant’s right to choose a judi-
cial forum.  But the debate among legal commentators on that issue is now over
a decade old, the debaters have long ago stopped listening to each other, and
there is probably very little new to say along those lines anyway.8  Rather than
addressing the fairness issues, I will address a new argument to a new audience:
true believers in arbitration.  By this intended audience, I do not mean corpo-
rate defendants who advocate mandatory arbitration to accomplish “do-it-your-
self tort reform”;9 academic commentators who view mandatory arbitration as a
laudable instance of economic efficiency,10 deregulation, or “freedom of con-
tract”;11 or financially-interested neutrals who identify themselves with true
believers in arbitration but who at heart see mandatory arbitration as a cash
cow.  Instead, I mean those who genuinely view arbitration as a salutary (faster,
cheaper, simpler) alternative to litigation.
I argue that mandatory arbitration tends to undermine the institution of
arbitration by eroding what is valuable about it.  Specifically, the forcing of
employment and consumer cases into the mandatory arbitration system has cre-
ated inexorable pressures to judicialize arbitration.  A system originally
designed as an alternative, not only to court, but also to the formality of law,
has become increasingly ringed and infused with law.  First, there is a large and
rapidly-expanding body of judicial doctrine framing the arbitration procedure
7 Schwartz, supra note 1, at 89-104 (tracing the “public policy exception” and its demise
starting with Mitsubishi).
8 An exception is Professor Sternlight’s recent fresh take on the well-worn debate. See
Sternlight, supra note 1, at 1633-35.  Sternlight argues that the fundamental policy question
underlying the mandatory arbitration debate should not be resolved by empirically based
arguments on which forum produces “better” outcomes for consumers and employees, but
by returning to “first principles” of procedural fairness and constitutionalism.  I attempt to
put my own spin on that argument in a separate forthcoming article and will not address
those issues here. See David S. Schwartz, Stop Waiting for the Social Scientists:  Why
Empirical Research Will Not Resolve the Mandatory Arbitration Debate (August 1, 2007)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
9 See, e.g., Eric J. Mogilnicki & Kirk D. Jensen, Arbitration and Unconscionability, 19 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 761 (2003).
10 See., e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation and
Arbitration:  An Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 549 (2003).
11 See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Con-
tractual Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 188 (2004);
Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (with A Contractual-
ist Reply To Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195 (1998).
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itself.  What I call “external” arbitration law includes court decisions on sundry
matters coming within the ambit of judicial interpretation of the FAA:  enforce-
ability of arbitration clauses, arbitrability of issues, and procedures for judicial
enforcement of arbitration both before and after the award.  Second, arbitration
is becoming “internally” judicialized, as procedures for how a case will be arbi-
trated are increasingly formalized.  There are more rules narrowing the differ-
ences between arbitration and court, rules that are imposed extra-contractually,
by case law, statute, professional organizations, and the arbitration providers
themselves.12
Moreover, as academic commentators we exacerbate this process of sur-
rounding and infusing arbitration with formal law.  Arbitration scholarship has
proliferated since the Second Trilogy, and its continued proliferation tends to
focus on increasingly specific doctrinal questions reflecting acceptance of or
resignation to the mandatory arbitration regime.  When we identify problems
with the arbitration system, we tend to propose new formal rules to solve them.
Whether or not our commentary actually fosters doctrine-creation by shining
spotlights on potential doctrinal problems, it certainly ratifies the increase of
legal complexity.  Few, if any, commentators in the field say that there should
be less arbitration “law.”
This judicialization of arbitration is all fallout from the Second Trilogy.
“Broad form” pre-dispute arbitration agreements—those requiring arbitration
of “all disputes” between the parties13—essentially transform the system of
private arbitration into “a civil court of general jurisdiction.”14  Because con-
sumers and employees are the protected parties in highly regulated contractual
relationships, forcing their claims into the arbitration system creates a tremen-
dous demand for “law” in the form of procedural regularity, substantive doc-
trine, and judicial scrutiny of the contractual mechanism putting them in this
situation.  In other words, contemporary arbitration law is largely how courts
and commentators cope with the two big mistakes underlying the Supreme
Court’s Second Trilogy.
I. ARBITRATION:  THE CLASSIC MODEL
As conceived and advocated at the time the FAA was enacted, arbitration
was not what it has become under the Second Trilogy:  a private court system
for public law disputes, and a widespread and lucrative employment opportu-
nity for lawyers and retired judges.
The classic model of arbitration is a binding dispute resolution system that
is faster, cheaper, and more user-friendly than court because it does away with
formal “law.”  The attraction of arbitration is based on the view that “law,”
12 Other commentators have noted aspects of this trend. See, e.g., Amy J. Schmitz, Ending
a Mud Bowl:  Defining Arbitration’s Finality Through Functional Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV.
123 (2002) (arguing that increased judicial scrutiny has undermined the finality of arbitra-
tion, muddying the distinction between arbitration and trial-court decision making).
13 See, e.g., Dennis L. Sharp & John M. Seitman, Write It Down, L.A. DAILY J. EXTRA,
Sept. 16, 2002, at 26.
14 Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerization of Arbitration, 92
NW. U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1997).
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both in its substantive and procedural aspects, consumes time and money.
Complex rules of pre-trial procedure—formerly arcane pleading requirements,
and now discovery and motion practice—require intensive legal work and post-
pone the trial.  Similarly, the non-intuitive rules of evidence make trials a com-
plex matter.  The appeals process adds months or years to the litigation process
and undermines the finality of trial court judgments.  The decisional law is
difficult to discern without extensive background training and research into the
problem at hand, often generating counter-intuitive results based on policies
and concerns that are not readily apparent or explicable to a lay person.
Classic arbitration provides an alternative to “law” at every turn:  Pre-
hearing procedure is virtually eliminated, the rules of evidence are dispensed
with—the arbitrator considers everything that’s arguably relevant—and the
merits are decided based on equity, common sense, or business norms known
and understood by the parties.  Appeals are for all intents and purposes elimi-
nated.  No lawyers are needed to navigate the rules of procedure, evidence, and
decisional precedent; no legally-trained judges (lawyers in robes and wigs) are
required to interpret and apply “the law.”  It is the lawyers and judges—who
must take time to do their thing and who must be paid for their time—that
inject cost and delay into dispute resolution.  At bottom, the persistent appeal of
arbitration is that it holds out the promise of providing justice without lawyers.
This view of arbitration is an idealization, but it is central to the debate
over pre-dispute arbitration clauses in two related senses.  First, the myth of do-
it-yourself justice infuses the pro-arbitration ideology in this debate:  The pic-
ture of fast, cheap, and lawyer-free dispute resolution continues to cast its rosy
glow over the arguments of proponents of mandatory arbitration.  Second, the
idealized model of arbitration provides a useful reference point in evaluating
the kind of arbitration we get under the Supreme Court’s Second Trilogy.  We
can ask where mandatory FAA arbitration fits on a spectrum with mythical
lawyer-free arbitration at one end and litigation at the other.  The closer
mandatory arbitration is to court, the more we can and should question whether
it is a valuable and valid alternative to the court system.
As a historical reality, the primary model of arbitration—and the primary
impetus behind the FAA—was a mechanism to resolve disputes within com-
munities of merchants.  As Professor Stone has persuasively argued in her lead-
ing account of the history of pre-dispute arbitration agreements, “the FAA was
enacted in response to the commercial community’s desire to strengthen the
internal arbitration systems of trade associations.”15  Something like the classi-
cal model of arbitration served three closely-related goals of these trade
associations.  First, arbitration would control the costs of disputing and there-
fore the cost of doing business.  Second, rules of decision would be supplied by
industry insiders according to the standards and norms of the particular trade,
rather than the general and arcane contract rules created by judges.  Third, dis-
putes could be kept “in the family” rather than put on expensive public display
in the courts.  While lawyers may well have been involved in drawing up the
15 Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice:  Community and Coercion Under the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 994 (1999).  The history is described in detail at
969-94. See also Schwartz, supra note 1, at 70-73.
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arbitration contracts, and perhaps in putting together arbitration cases, their
presence was not essential and was frequently dispensed with; also the presence
of legally trained arbitrators was the rare exception rather than the rule since
the whole point was to have non-lawyerly decisions based on business norms
rather than legal precedent.16
Business lawyers were instrumental in the passage of the FAA, but their
role was limited to managing the point of contact between these arbitration
systems and “the law,” in essence shielding the arbitration system from law and
lawyers by making sure that arbitration agreements and awards would be
enforced to prevent a disgruntled party from turning outside the self-regulating
trade association for help.17
Pre-dispute arbitration under the FAA makes sense against this historical
backdrop.  As I have argued elsewhere:
[P]re-dispute clauses, if enforced, have an element of compulsion.  Enforcement of
the clause presupposes that at least one of the parties, with the dispute before her, has
reconsidered the appropriateness of arbitration.  The pre-dispute agreement now acts
to restrict choice.  Moreover, parties to the agreement may not have freely chosen the
clause if it was a compulsory condition of membership in the commercial or social
group.  In the paradigm cases, however, equality and community of interest serve as
a rough substitute for voluntariness.  The imposition of a regime of arbitration of
future disputes is not unduly oppressive if, ex ante, it appears that any member is
equally likely to be a plaintiff or a defendant, and each member stands as good a
chance of success in arbitration as any other.  This is particularly so where the parties
have some idea in advance what the nature of their disputes will be—a hallmark of
the commercial paradigm.  These assumptions mean that the burdens and benefits of
pre-dispute arbitration are equally distributed.18
The FAA implicitly incorporates a classical view of arbitration.  The FAA
itself provides virtually no “internal” arbitration law—other than providing the
arbitrator with subpoena power and implying that an arbitrator should be unbi-
ased and should not unfairly restrict a party from presenting relevant evidence,
the statute says almost nothing about how the arbitration is to be conducted.
By implication, the default rules of how arbitration will be conducted are sup-
plied by tradition.  Absent an agreement to the contrary, the arbitrator need
make no provision for discovery, create a record, or give reasons for his
award.19
16 CLARENCE F. BIRDSEYE, ARBITRATION AND BUSINESS ETHICS 35 (1926); LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 45-46 (2d ed. 1985); Reginald Alleyne, Delawy-
erizing Labor Arbitration, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 93, 94 (1989); William Catron Jones, Three
Centuries of Commercial Arbitration in New York:  A Brief Survey, 1956 WASH. U. L.Q.
193, 212; Philip G. Phillips, Synthetic Courts—A General Introduction, 83 U. PA. L. REV.
119, 126 (1934); Joseph Antonio Raffaele, Lawyers in Labor Arbitration, ARB. J., Sept.
1982, at 14, 15; Schwartz, supra note 1, at 70-73; Van Wezel Stone, supra note 15, at 976-
79; Earl S. Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L.
REV. 132, 144 (1934).
17 Sabra A. Jones, Historical Development of Commercial Arbitration in the United States,
12 MINN. L. REV. 240, 258 (1928); Schwartz, supra note 1, at 70-71.
18 Schwartz, supra note 1, at 72.
19 See 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2000) (court may appoint arbitrator where parties fail to do so); § 7
(arbitrators’ power to compel witness attendance); §§ 9-11 (confirmation and review of
awards). See generally 2 THOMAS H. OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 89-3 (3d ed.
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On the other hand, classical arbitration pursuant to pre-dispute agreements
does not fit nearly so well when the dispute is between parties who are not part
of the “self-regulat[ing] . . . normative community” of a trade association.
Under these circumstances there are fewer agreed-upon private norms to supply
rules of decision, less mutual interest in keeping the dispute “within the fam-
ily,” a greater likelihood of a public interest in the dispute, and a greater need to
resort to the rules of decision created by public institutions.  Moreover, while
cheap and fast dispute resolution is all well in theory, the insider v. outsider
dispute is more likely to involve disparities of wealth and knowledge for which
the presence of lawyers—though more expensive—can make the playing field
more level.
All of these limitations of traditional private arbitration were very much in
the mind of the Supreme Court when it held, in Wilko v. Swan,20 that arbitra-
tion was an unsuitable vehicle for the resolution of claims under public regula-
tory statutes.  A painful illustration of this was the early experience with the
first crop of employment discrimination cases within the securities industry,
which had been compelled into arbitration under the securities exchange’s
“trade association” pre-dispute arbitration clauses.  The strong anecdotal
impressions of plaintiffs and practitioners were that discrimination claims were
routinely rejected or drastically undervalued by arbitrators, who were uniformly
gray-haired white men drawn from the ranks of retired stockbrokers, the same
arbitrators who resolved other securities industry disputes.21  In overruling
Wilko, the Second Trilogy Supreme Court would say, not that classical arbitra-
tion was adequate for public law disputes after all, but rather that arbitration
itself had changed.  How?  By the introduction of more lawyers.
Arbitration became adequate for public law claims because arbitrators
would be lawyers or judges able to apply the law.  The Mitsubishi-Gilmer line
of cases is expressly premised on the idea that the relevant substantive law
must be applied in arbitrations of statutory cases:  “‘[B]y agreeing to arbitrate a
statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the
statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial,
forum.’”22  The cases further imply a reliance on the influx of legally trained
2007) (arbitrator not required to permit discovery absent contractual requirement); Schwartz,
supra note 1, at 40-53.
20 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/
Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); accord Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350
U.S. 198, 203 (1956) (“Arbitrators do not have the benefit of judicial instruction on the law;
they need not give their reasons for their results; the record of their proceedings is not as
complete as it is in a court trial; and judicial review of an award is more limited than judicial
review of a trial—all as discussed in Wilko v. Swan.”).
21 A General Accounting Office survey showed that, as of December 31, 1992, the pool of
New York Stock Exchange arbitrators based in New York was 89% male and 97% white;
the average age of male arbitrators was sixty. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION:  HOW REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVES FARE IN DISCRIMINATION DISPUTES
7-8 (1994); see also Robert R. Gregory, Arbitration:  It’s Mandatory But It Ain’t Fair, 19
SEC. REG. L.J. 181, 183 (1991); Isaac C. Hunt, Jr., Securities Arbitration:  Issues of Interest,
40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1095, 1100 (1998).
22 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
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arbitrators since the time when Wilko had expressed “concern[ ] that arbitrators
must make legal determinations ‘without judicial instruction on the law.’”23
II. THE SECOND ARBITRATION TRILOGY:  THE SUPREME
COURT’S TWO BIG MISTAKES
A. The Demise of the Public Policy Exception
Prior to 1985, it was generally held in the lower courts that statutory
causes of action reflecting “important public policies,” could not be sent into
mandatory arbitration under the FAA.24  This so-called “public policy excep-
tion” to FAA enforcement was rooted in two precedents.  Citing perceived
inadequacies of arbitration to protect investors’ rights under the federal securi-
ties laws, the Supreme Court held in 1953 in Wilko v. Swan25 that a pre-dispute
agreement was ineffective to compel arbitration of claims under the 1933
Securities Act.26  A Second Circuit decision in 1968, American Safety Equip-
ment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co.,27 held the same for Sherman Antitrust Act
claims, stating that “it hardly seems proper for [arbitrators] to determine these
issues of great public interest.”28 American Safety was uniformly followed by
the other circuits for antitrust claims,29 and the Wilko-American Safety “public
policy exception” was extended to other statutory claims, including employ-
ment and civil rights claims.30
The “public policy exception” cases were animated by concerns that arbi-
tration was an inadequate forum for public policy claims.31  Significantly, all of
the “public policy” claims involved causes of action under a private attorney
general model, in which injured plaintiffs are viewed as a vehicle for the
enforcement of important regulatory policies and are encouraged by attorneys’
fee-shifting.  And the regulations under these statutes are, for the most part,
efforts at redressing market failures resulting from power imbalances and over-
reaching by the stronger party in a contract setting.  The public policy cases
viewed pre-dispute arbitration agreements as another example of the stronger,
drafting party to an adhesion contract attempting to extract a pre-dispute waiver
of a “substantial” right—here, the right to a judicial forum.  In that sense, pre-
23 Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 231 (1987) (quoting Wilko, 346
U.S. at 436).
24 See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 89-104.
25 Wilko, 346 U.S. 427.
26 Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74, (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa
(2000)).
27 Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
28 Id. at 827.
29 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 655-56
(1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing cases from seven circuits).
30 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (42 U.S.C. § 1983);
Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (Fair Labor Standards Act);
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964); Schwartz, supra note 1, at 92-94 & n.242.
31 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/
Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); accord Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350
U.S. 198, 203 (1956); see Schwartz, supra note 1, at 89-95.
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dispute arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts were no different from pre-
dispute rights waivers generally, a sort of contract term long disfavored by the
courts.32
But starting with its 1985 decision in Mitsubishi33—the third case in the
Second Trilogy—the Supreme Court dismantled the public policy exception.
Mitsubishi overruled the American Safety doctrine by holding that antitrust
claims were arbitrable, and in subsequent decisions, the Court overruled Wilko
as to securities claims.34  Finally, in 1991, the Court in Gilmer v. Interstate/
Johnson Lane Corp.35 upheld a decision compelling arbitration of a statutory
claim of age discrimination in employment, thus signaling to the lower courts
that any and all civil rights claims may likewise be subject to mandatory arbi-
tration.  Under current doctrine, any statutory claim is subject to mandatory
arbitration, absent a clear showing of a congressional intent to limit or prohibit
waiver of a judicial forum.  Although the Court in theory recognized that that
intent could be inferred from legislative history or “an inherent conflict
between arbitration and the statute’s underlying purposes,”36 the Court has
never inferred such an intent.  There is no longer a public policy exception, and
for all practical purposes, only an express rejection of pre-dispute arbitration by
Congress will be effective.
The Court’s major analytical move in overruling the public policy excep-
tion was to reject the former skepticism about the adequacy of arbitration as a
forum for vindicating rights.  As Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority in
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,37  “To the extent that
Wilko rested on suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the protec-
tions afforded in the substantive law to would-be complainants, it has fallen far
out of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring
this method of resolving disputes.”38  Put another way, a pre-dispute arbitration
agreement does not involve a waiver of any “substantive” or even “substantial”
rights,39 but is merely “procedural” in nature.40  As the Court’s modern cases
have frequently stated:
By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego the substantive
rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather
32 Schwartz, supra note 1, at 110-21.
33 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614.
34 Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. 477; see also Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon,
482 U.S. 220 (1987) (holding RICO and Securities Exchanges Act claims arbitrable).
35 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
36 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227.
37 Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. 477.
38 Id. at 481; accord Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30.
39 The term “substantial” has been frequently used by the Supreme Court, particularly in the
1950s and 1960s, to indicate rights that may be formally “procedural” but whose advance
waiver is considered non-neutral and therefore disfavored, such as the right to jury trial. See
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (access to judicial forum rather than arbitration is
a “substantial” right); Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952)
(jury trial held to be a “substantial” right); David S. Schwartz, The Federal Arbitration Act
and the Power of Congress over State Courts, 83 OR. L. REV. 541, 604 (2004).
40 Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 481-82; see Schwartz, supra note 39, at 604-06.
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than a judicial, forum.  It trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the
courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.41
Without disturbing the general policy against prospective waivers of substan-
tive rights, the Court has overruled the public policy exception by recharacter-
izing arbitration as a neutral procedural right rather than a substantive one.
The revisionist vision of arbitration as an adjunct court system with legally
trained arbitrators applying statutory and decisional law—in contrast to the
classic model with businessmen-arbitrators42—may well have had some empir-
ical basis by the mid-to-late 1980s.  This would have rightly allayed some of
the concerns stated in the public policy cases.  But it would take no great seer
to predict that Mitsubishi and its progeny would increase that trend.  The dis-
mantling of the public policy exception demands non-industry arbitrators sim-
ply to attain neutrality:  When the claimants are all outsiders—consumers and
employees whose disputing positions are adverse to the industry itself—you
can’t have a fair system where the judges are drawn from industry insiders.
Further, to sustain the notion that arbitrators will apply governing statutory law,
arbitrators have to be drawn from the ranks of the legally trained.
Finally, the kinds of disputes involved in public policy cases—those
involving regulated relationships between parties with significant disparities in
bargaining power—are highly correlated with disparities in access to facts rele-
vant to the dispute.  The placement of the burden of production on claimants
means that most consumers and employees cannot carry their burden of proof
with the information already in their possession.  Hence, the tradition of arbitra-
tion free from “burdensome discovery” has to go out the window, or else claim-
ants will be placed in a systematic disadvantage in proving their claims.  In
sum, the Court undoubtedly failed to perceive the tremendous pressures toward
judicialization that its public policy rulings would place on the arbitration
system.
B. Preemption of State Law
The other two cases in the trilogy greatly complicated arbitration law by
federalizing it.  In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction
Corp.,43 the defendant Mercury was sued in state court on a construction con-
tract.  Mercury then countersued with a diversity action in federal district court,
petitioning for a stay of the state court case and an order compelling the hospi-
tal to arbitrate, pursuant to section 4 of the FAA.  The district court stayed the
federal case in deference to the preexisting state case, under the Colorado River
abstention doctrine,44 but the Supreme Court reversed.  Although the main
issue was the propriety of federal abstention—not FAA interpretation—the
Court found it useful to support its anti-abstention ruling by inflating the fed-
41 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985);
accord Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001); Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26;
Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 481; McMahon, 482 U.S. at 229-30.
42 See supra text accompanying notes 17-21.
43 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
44 See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) (holding
that the pendency of an action in state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same
matter in a federal court having jurisdiction).
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eral interests purportedly at stake:  the importance of keeping the federal court
open to hear a petition to compel arbitration.
The basic issue presented in Mercury’s federal suit was the arbitrability of the
dispute between Mercury and the Hospital.  Federal law in the terms of the Arbitra-
tion Act governs that issue in either state or federal court.  Section 2 is the primary
substantive provision of the Act . . . .  Section 2 is a congressional declaration of a
liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state sub-
stantive or procedural policies to the contrary.  The effect of the section is to create a
body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agree-
ment within the coverage of the Act.45
This passage was arguably dicta since the opinion had already articulated a
complete argument against abstention and threw in this point about the FAA as
a “B-side” argument.  And it was “ill considered” dicta at that:  The Court
issued these sweeping assertions about the FAA’s intent to create substantive
rules of decision for state courts—in essence, a broad assertion about federal
preemption—without any of the statutory analysis normally applied to preemp-
tion rulings.46
The next year, in Southland Corp v. Keating,47 the issue of FAA preemp-
tion was squarely presented.  The California courts had denied arbitration of a
state-law franchisee-franchisor dispute under a provision in the state franchise
statute that barred advance waiver of the right to bring claims in court.  The
U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 2 of the FAA created a sub-
stantive “national policy favoring arbitration” that applied in state court and
preempted the state anti-arbitration rule.48  Although Moses H. Cone had laid
the groundwork for the Southland decision, it is in Southland that the Court
clearly established FAA preemption.
I will not repeat the arguments I have made elsewhere, that the Southland
decision was wrong as a matter of FAA statutory interpretation, and that it
applies the FAA in an unconstitutional manner by dictating procedural rules to
state courts.49  Suffice it to say that Southland has made the FAA into one of
the more extensive regimes of federal preemption, nullifying dozens of state
substantive and procedural laws.50  The result has indeed been the creation of a
body of federal common law of contract as suggested by Moses H. Cone.  This
is problematic, not merely because of abstract federalism concerns, but very
practical ones.  By making the interpretation of every arbitration agreement at
least arguably a question of federal law, the Moses H. Cone/Southland doctrine
creates great confusion in the lower courts about determining when state law
applies, multiplying the number of issues, and creating uncertainty about the
vitality of state contract regulation.
45 Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24.
46 On this point, the Court relied entirely—and erroneously—on Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967), a case which had said nothing
about the FAA as substantive law or about federal preemption. See David S. Schwartz,
Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation:  The Supreme Court and the
Federal Arbitration Act, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 36-38 (2004).
47 Southland Corp v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
48 Id. at 10.
49 See Schwartz, supra note 39; Schwartz, supra note 46.
50 Schwartz, supra note 39, at 549 n.29.
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III. JUDICIALIZING ARBITRATION BY SURROUNDING IT WITH LAW
A. The Excessive Increase of “External” Arbitration Doctrine
The external or framing law of arbitration—questions concerning whether
and what issues will be arbitrated and post-award judicial review—continues to
grow.  This is to be expected.  The stakes for the plaintiffs appear sufficiently
high for them to litigate these issues, and courts are at least somewhat sensitive
to their duty to scrutinize adhesion contract terms by which regulated entities
seek to lessen the impact of regulation.  These two factors mean that mandatory
arbitration puts pressure on courts to generate more framing law.  And it
appears that courts have done that:  By my rough estimate, the number of judi-
cial decisions involving the FAA has doubled relative to federal cases generally
since 1992 and increased roughly sixfold since 1981.51
What accounts for this huge increase in arbitration cases relative to other
cases?  The spread of arbitration agreements is a possible cause, but that should
not be overestimated.  Lawyers—particularly plaintiffs’ lawyers representing
employees and consumers typically on a contingency fee basis—are not in the
business of filing slam-dunk losing motions, nor are courts in the business of
publishing decisions on well-trodden, open-and-shut legal points.  So if arbitra-
tion law were clear and settled, the number of judicial decisions relating to
arbitration might be expected to level or decline even if the practice of
mandatory arbitration were to spread.  A major contributor to an increase in
judicial decisions on arbitration law is likely to be the presence of arguable
issues.  That is to say, doctrinal uncertainty generates litigated issues and pub-
lished decisions on them.
This hypothesis seems borne out by the growth of arbitration doctrine.
The array of currently unresolved issues that frame mandatory arbitration is
truly daunting.  Professor Richard Bales, for example, has argued that the
development of arbitration case law has been so rapid and extensive that the
American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) Employment Due Process Protocol
has fallen seriously out-of-date in only the first ten years of its existence.52
Bales usefully catalogues some twenty unresolved issues in current arbitration
law, a count that I think is conservative.53  For instance, Bales does not include
51 See Appendix A.  As explained in the appendix, my methodology was far from rigorous,
so the estimate is merely suggestive.
52 Richard A. Bales, The Employment Due Process Protocol at Ten:  Twenty Unresolved
Issues, and a Focus on Conflicts of Interest, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 165 (2005).
53 Bales’s list organizes the 20 issues under six main headings: (A)  Contract formation
issues:  (1) notice requirements; (2) the employee’s opportunity to consider the agreement;
(3) the employer’s right to modify the agreement unilaterally; (4) mutuality of obligation to
arbitrate; (5) consideration; (6) whether pre-dispute agreements are enforceable. (B) Barri-
ers to access:  (7) shortened statutes of limitations to file arbitration claims; (8) imposition of
arbitration filing fees on claimants; (9) awards shifting arbitrator fees onto claimants; (10)
class action bans; (11) geographic forum selection clauses; (12) confidentiality of awards.
(C) Process issues:  (13) arbitrator selection; (14) availability of discovery. (D) Remedies
issues:  (15) remedy-stripping arbitration agreements; (16) discrepancies between arbitral
and statutory attorneys’ fee-shifting. (E) FAA issues:  (17) EEOC’s ability to pursue claims
already brought by an employee in arbitration; (18) scope of “transportation workers” exclu-
sion from FAA coverage; (19) power of a union to waive members’ right to a judicial forum
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FAA preemption; the division of authority between the arbitrator and the court;
severability of unconscionable terms; or the scope of judicial review of arbitra-
tion awards.  In addition, there are multiple facets to the single issue of “rem-
edy-stripping” arbitration clauses, and new issues relating to unconscionability
continue to arise—for example, whether otherwise unconscionable clauses can
be enforced if the agreement offers the consumer or employee an “opt-out”
check box.  These unsettled issues in arbitration law—perhaps as many as
thirty—would each require at least several pages of treatise to explain in detail.
More to the point, each of these subjects creates arguable issues for litigation.
B. Nagging Doctrinal Issues
The following are three significant areas of unsettled arbitration doctrine.
Each illustrates both the continued generation of issues for litigation and the
courts’ less-than-stellar performance in resolving them.
1. The Scope of Federal Preemption
Among its many failings, the Southland decision is ambiguous about the
scope of FAA preemption and creates irreconcilable tensions with the so-called
“savings clause” of section 2, which states that arbitration clauses are enforcea-
ble “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract.”54  Making the best of a messed up doctrinal situation, the courts
have generally understood the FAA to preempt laws that regulate arbitration
agreements per se, while preserving from preemption those state contract laws
that are not specific to arbitration.  In other words, a state law providing that
arbitration agreements must be in bold 9-point type or larger would be pre-
empted, whereas a state law providing that advance waivers of rights must be in
bold 9-point type or larger would not be.55
Regrettably, the Supreme Court’s sporadic stabs at explaining when the
FAA preempts state law have been largely a mess.56  For instance, the Court
has said that what the FAA saves from preemption is regulation of “contracts
generally” or “general contract law.”57  But after creating this ill-conceived dis-
tinction between “general” and arbitration-specific contract law, the Court has
explained it badly.58  Further, in Bazzle, the Court eschewed the opportunity to
for statutory claims. (F) Conflicts of interest:  (20) Regulating arbitrators’ conflicts of inter-
est. Id. at 184-96.
54 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
55 See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (stating that the
FAA “preclude[s] States from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect status”); Ting v.
AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1152 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that the FAA preempts laws that are
“hostile” to arbitration); Goff Group, Inc. v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1150
(M.D. Ala. 2002) (same). But see Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Pre-
emption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 409-10 (2004).
56 See Schwartz, supra note 39, at 557-62.
57 See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995) (“States may
regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under general contract law principles . . . .”).
58 The Court stated in Perry v. Thomas, for example, that “[a] state-law principle that takes
its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue” is preempted.  482
U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987).  This is a strange way of explaining that “general” state contract
law is preserved from preemption, since any “general” contract principle must be applied to
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clear up a related misconception that the FAA creates a federal “enforce as
written” rule preempting any state law whose application would vary the terms
of an arbitration agreement; instead, the three-justice dissent gave the argument
credibility by embracing it, while the plurality opinion did not discuss it.59
With this pattern of judicial inattention and ambiguity, the Court has inadver-
tently lent support to overly broad preemption arguments.  Suppose the corpo-
rate defendant has drafted an arbitration agreement to compel a waiver of
injunctive relief, compensatory damages, or attorney fees guaranteed by a state
consumer or antidiscrimination statute.  The defendant can now argue for
enforcement of these terms—plainly unconscionable and against public pol-
icy—on two grounds.  First, the purported federal “enforce as written rule”
preempts any state law that would vary the written terms of an arbitration
agreement.60  Second, because state consumer protection statutes involve sub-
categories of contracts—only consumer contracts—they are not “general con-
tract law” and are preempted by the FAA.61
These arguments are plainly wrong—even farfetched—as I have argued
elsewhere.62  Yet some courts have entertained them, injecting new uncertainty
into the scope of FAA preemption.  And the potential consequences are scary
an arbitration clause to determine its validity—and the general principle necessarily “takes
meaning” from the specific application.  The Court’s next attempt at clarification, in Allied-
Bruce was even less helpful:
States may regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under general contract law principles
and they may invalidate an arbitration clause “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added).  What States may not do is
decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not
fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause.
513 U.S. at 281.  These pronouncements probably mean, as the Court stated in Casarotto,
that the FAA preempts state laws that “singl[e] out arbitration provisions for suspect status.”
517 U.S. at 687.
59 See Schwartz, supra note 39, at 564-68.
60 In Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, for example, the three dissenting justices
accepted the defendant’s argument that a state law that would have allowed class actions
despite a purported class action ban in an arbitration clause was preempted by the FAA,
which required the arbitration agreement to be enforced “according to [its] terms.”  539 U.S.
444, 458-59 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Mas-
trobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 54 (1995)).  The majority did not
address the issue.
61 Bradley v. Harris Research Inc., 275 F.3d 884, 893 (9th Cir. 2001), held that a California
statute barring unfair venue provisions in franchise agreements was preempted by the FAA
because it was not “general contract law.”  For cases making the same error, see Ting v.
AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1148 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that the provision of the California
consumer protection statute prohibiting contractual waiver of class action remedy is pre-
empted because consumer protection statute is not “general contract law”); KKW Enter-
prises., Inc. v. Gloria Jean’s Gourmet Coffees Franchising Corp., 184 F.3d 42, 50 (1st Cir.
1999) (holding that FAA preempts venue provision in state franchise law); Doctor’s Associ-
ates., Inc. v. Hamilton, 150 F.3d 157, 163 (2d Cir. 1998) (same); and Boynton v. ESC Medi-
cal System, Inc., 566 S.E.2d 730 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).  Legal scholars are also beginning to
make this same error. See, e.g., Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the
Unconscionability Doctrine:  How the California Courts Are Circumventing the Federal
Arbitration Act, 3 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 39 (2006); Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostil-
ity to Arbitration:  Federal Preemption, Contract Unconscionability, and Agreements to
Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469.
62 Schwartz, supra note 39, at 564-70.
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for consumers and employees:  If accepted, these arguments threaten to turn
arbitration agreements into blanket exemptions from consumer protection and
other statutes aimed at preventing contractual overreaching.  The Supreme
Court should have cleared up this issue by now.63
2. Class Actions
Class actions are a significant component of legal enforcement of con-
sumer protection laws and wage and hour laws.64  It is well understood that, but
for class actions, many kinds of legal violations committed on a large scale can
go unremedied, if the damages caused by each individual violation is small
enough to make the filing of individual lawsuits economically unfeasible.65
Thus, for certain categories of potential corporate defendants, the most attrac-
tive feature of pre-dispute arbitration clauses is the possibility that it may elimi-
nate class actions, and thereby gain de facto immunity from suit.66
The problem of class actions and arbitrations could be resolved in a vari-
ety of ways, depending on the resolution of two basic questions:  (1) whether,
as a matter of public policy, arbitrators have the authority to issue class-wide
relief; and (2) whether an arbitration provision can bar class actions.  If arbitra-
tors have the authority to issue class-wide awards, then presumably their power
to do so will be a question of construing the arbitration agreement.  But what if
the agreement doesn’t expressly grant, or expressly precludes, class action
authority?  Does this mean that the would-be class-action plaintiff has a ground
to defeat a motion to compel arbitration and can file a class action in court?  Or
63 The Court has not even decided whether the FAA’s indisputably procedural provisions
apply in state court.  When presented with the opportunity to resolve that question in Volt
Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, the
Court held that the arbitration agreement should be construed to have chosen state procedu-
ral law.  489 U.S. 468 (1989).  In typical fashion in its arbitration jurisprudence, the Court
used an idiosyncrasy in the arbitration agreement to make the larger legal issue disappear.
Id. at 477-79.  I have argued that the FAA is in fact entirely procedural, contrary to South-
land. See Schwartz, supra note 39, at 547-54, 600-15.  Although the Supreme Court consid-
ers FAA section 2 to be substantive, it recognizes that the rest of the statute is procedural.
See Volt, 489 U.S. at 477 & n.6.  The question should have been a fairly easy one.
64 For purposes of this discussion, my use of the term “class action” should be understood to
include “collective” actions for wage and hour violations under the Fair Labor Standards
Act.
65 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“The policy at the very core
of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not pro-
vide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights.”);
see Myriam E. Gilles, Opting Out of Liability:  The Forthcoming Near-Total Demise of the
Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2005); Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory
Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1, 28-33 (2000).
66 Alan S. Kaplinsky, a leading mandatory arbitration spokesman and attorney representing
financial services institutions, has claimed, “Arbitration is a powerful deterrent to class
action lawsuits against lenders . . . .  Stripped of the threat of a class action, plaintiffs’
lawyers have much less incentive to sue.”  Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Excuse Me,
But Who’s the Predator?  Banks Can Use Arbitration Clauses as a Defense, BUS. L. TODAY,
May-June 1998, at 24, 25-26, available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/blt/7-5excu.html;
see also Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Consumer Financial Services Law:  Is JAMS in
a Jam Over Its Policy Regarding Class Action Waivers in Consumer Arbitration Agree-
ments?, 61 BUS. LAW. 923 (2006).
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does it mean that the drafting party can effectively prevent any class action
suits from ever being filed against it?  The same question arises if arbitrators
lack the authority to award class-wide relief:  If that is the rule, and the plaintiff
is subject to mandatory arbitration, must he then go forward and lose the
chance to bring a class action or does his class claim defeat a motion to compel
arbitration?
The Supreme Court has maddeningly minced around all these questions,
answering none of them definitively when the issues were squarely presented in
Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle.67  The defendant Green Tree appealed a
$27 million consumer class arbitration award, arguing that arbitration agree-
ments did not expressly provide for class arbitrations and therefore impliedly
withheld class-wide relief power from the arbitrator.68  The South Carolina
courts ruled that the arbitration agreements and state procedural law authorized
class arbitrations.  But a four-justice plurality decision by Justice Breyer—
joined in the judgment by Justice Stevens—held that the issue of “whether the
arbitration contracts forbid class arbitration” was a contract-interpretation ques-
tion for the arbitrator, and not the courts.69  By deciding that the arbitrator had
to construe the arbitration agreement to determine whether it in fact barred
class actions, the Court declined to decide whether an arbitration clause that did
ban class actions would be enforceable.  Technically, the Court did not even
definitively tell us whether states can deny arbitrators the authority to issue
class-wide relief or whether the FAA addresses that issue.  Indeed, Bazzle’s
holding may be nothing more than a statement that we need to hear from the
arbitrator what the contract says about class arbitration before deciding any
class arbitration issues.  It is a decision that creates far more wiggle room than
precedential guidance.  As complex and important as this question of arbitra-
tion and class actions is, it remains very much adrift among conflicting lower
court precedents.70
3. Unconscionability, Remedy-Stripping, and Severability
By nature most unconscionability claims will be brought by non-drafting
parties in adhesion contracting situations regulated by public laws.  In the arbi-
tration setting, then, the decision to overrule the public policy exception in
Mitsubishi and its progeny is necessarily responsible for an influx of uncon-
scionability cases.  Overreaching is a predictable, almost natural phenomenon
of contracting in a context of unequal bargaining power and regulated relation-
ships, and development of unconscionability doctrine is a predictable judicial
response to constrain contractual unfairness.  Unconscionability is probably the
most frequent basis for challenges to arbitration agreements.71
67 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
68 Brief of Petitioner, Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (No. 02-634).
69 Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 452.
70 Compare Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 277 (7th Cir. 1995) (class action
waivable by arbitration clause under FAA), with Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d
1100 (Cal. 2005) (class action waiver unconscionable).
71 A successful challenge to a contract term as “unconscionable” typically requires a show-
ing both that a contract term is unfair in its application and that it was created through an
unfair—typically, adhesive—bargaining process. The unfair term is denoted “substantively”
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Arbitration agreements have been found unconscionable for having either
or both of two features:  (1) “remedy-stripping” provisions, that is to say, terms
purporting to deprive the adhering party of remedies;72 or (2) a skewed arbitra-
tion process that violates fundamental norms of procedural fairness.73  While
there is now a substantial body of case law deciding the enforceability of
unconscionable arbitration clauses, the law is far from settled.
Remedy-stripping arbitration agreements typically withhold from the arbi-
trator the authority to grant particular remedies—such as compensatory or
punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, or class-wide relief—to which the plaintiff
would otherwise be entitled.  It is a fundamental principle of arbitration law
that the powers of the arbitrator are determined by the arbitration agreement
between the parties; therefore, the notion of restricting arbitrable issues or arbi-
trator powers is not inherently offensive.  It is only when the contract purports
to restrict remedies while precluding resort to the courts that remedy-stripping
clauses take on their problematic character.  Although the arbitration require-
ment is clearly designed to work in tandem with the remedy-stripping provision
to affect prospective waivers of remedies, it is also clear that the two goals of
such a clause—arbitration and remedy-stripping—are separable as a matter of
logic and policy.  Thus, even if one were to accept the idea that the FAA
declares “a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,”74 it doesn’t
follow that the FAA favors waivers of other rights—rights other than access to
court—simply because they are added to an arbitration clause.
When the right in question involves compensatory damages or statutory
attorneys’ fees, lower courts have usually rejected the prospective waiver of
substantive rights, though the rationales have varied and not always been clear.
Some courts find such remedy-stripping unconscionable or a significant con-
tributor to unconscionability—while others have stated that the waiver “vio-
lates the statute” granting the remedy.75
Courts have displayed the greatest inconsistency on the fundamental ques-
tion of what to do when an arbitration agreement has been found unconsciona-
ble or otherwise unenforceable due to overreaching by the drafting party.  The
question—typically called “severability,” and less commonly, the “blue pencil
rule”—is whether the remedy should be to refuse enforcement of the arbitration
clause as a whole, or else to “sever” or “blue pencil” the offending provisions
and enforce a judicially revised, fairer version of the arbitration agreement.
unconscionable, while the unfair bargaining process is called “procedural.” See, e.g., Dis-
cover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1109.
72 See David S. Schwartz, Understanding Remedy-Stripping Arbitration Clauses:  Validity,
Arbitrability, and Preclusion Principles, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 49 (2003).
73 See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he
promulgation of so many biased rules” created “a sham system unworthy even of the name
of arbitration.”); Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981) (arbitration agree-
ment allowing one party to choose arbitrator held unconscionable).
74 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
75 Compare Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 272 (3d Cir. 2003) (“uncon-
scionable”), with Graham Oil Co. v. Arco Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1248-49 (9th Cir. 1994)
(“ARCO violated the purpose as well as the specific terms of” the substantive statute.).
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Courts have split on the appropriate remedy and made little effort to define
when one course should be pursued over the other.76
But for a judicial desire to force more cases into arbitration, the proper
course seems fairly obvious.  Remedy-stripping arbitration clauses are attempts
to misuse the judicially favored arbitration vehicle to affect remedies waivers
that violate public policy.  If drafters know that the worst courts will do to them
is simply to give them the arbitration clause they should have written in the first
place, there will be no down-side to overdrafting, but a likely up-side:  Many
adhering parties may fail to challenge the oppressive contract term.  Thus, as I
have argued elsewhere, the surest deterrent to such overdrafting is a clear rule
that a remedy-stripping arbitration clause will be held invalid as a whole:
Overreaching arbitration clauses should never be blue-penciled.77
The Court has issued three decisions in which it considered remedy-strip-
ping arbitration agreements without ever resolving whether such agreements
are enforceable, let alone giving guidance on the severability issue.  In Mas-
trobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,78 the defendant brokerage house
contested an arbitrator’s award of punitive damages on the argument that its
customer arbitration agreement effectively barred punitive damages.79 Pacifi-
Care Health Systems, Inc. v. Book80 squarely raised the issue of whether rem-
edy-stripping arbitration clauses purporting to bar “extracontractual” and
punitive damages were enforceable in a civil RICO case.  And in Green Tree
Financial Corp. v. Bazzle,81 the Court was asked to decide whether an arbitra-
tion agreement could bar class-wide relief.
In each case, the Court dodged the main issue—is a remedy-stripping arbi-
tration agreement enforceable?—by finding the contracts ambiguous and ques-
tioning whether the contract language in fact barred the remedy in question.  In
Mastrobuono, despite affirming the punitive damage award and noting that
punitive damages are “an important substantive right,” the Court did not decide
whether a prospective waiver of that right in an arbitration clause would be
enforceable.  Instead the Court construed the supposed ambiguity against the
drafter, Shearson, and determined that the agreement permitted the arbitrator to
award punitive damages.82  In both Book and Bazzle, decided in the span of
two months in the Court’s 2002-03 Term, the Court again trumped up some
contractual ambiguities and, this time, remanded the case to the arbitrator to
76 For cases striking down remedy-stripping clauses in their entirety, see, e.g., Graham Oil
Co., 43 F.3d at 1248-49, and Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services., Inc., 6
P.3d 669, 699 (Cal. 2000).  For cases enforcing arbitration clauses after blue-penciling or
severing unconscionable terms, see, e.g., Paladino v. Avnet Computer Technologies, Inc.,
134 F.3d 1054 (11th Cir. 1998), Cole v. Burns International Security Services, 105 F.3d
1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997), and Scissor-Tail, 623 P.2d 165.
77 See Schwartz, supra note 72, at 66-69.
78 Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
79 Specifically, the agreement incorporated New York decisional law, under which arbitra-
tors had no authority to award punitive damages. See Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353
N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976).  Shearson argued that its customer had thereby “lawfully agree[d]
to . . . waiv[e] any claim for punitive damages.” Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 58.
80 PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003).
81 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
82 Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 62-63.
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decide whether the contract precluded the damages or class-wide remedies,83
opining that it was “premature” to address the enforceability question.84
Although remedy-stripping agreements have rarely, if ever, been enforced by
lower courts, the Supreme Court’s treatment extends vague hopes for aggres-
sive contract drafters that remedy-stripping provisions might be enforceable
yet—either because arbitrators will get control of the question and decide to
enforce such clauses in individual cases, or because of federal preemption.
Labeling the enforcement question “premature” is painfully ironic—
whether one means “premature” in reference to the procedural posture of the
Bazzle and Book cases, as the Court meant, or “premature” in the doctrinal
history of the FAA.  The enforcement question was ripe for decision without a
remand to the arbitrator since the validity of an arbitration agreement has
always been a threshold question for courts rather than arbitrators, and a rem-
edy-stripping provision is a ground to refuse to enforce an arbitration agree-
ment—though Bazzle and Book do their utmost to muck up that point.  As for
the broader doctrinal question of whether remedy-stripping agreements are
valid, that issue has been kicking around for two decades.  In Mitsubishi itself,
the Court reassured us that a party compelled to arbitrate “does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute”85 and that “in the event the choice-
of-forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver
of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we would
have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public policy.”86
The Court has often reiterated this point—in dicta.87  That the validity of rem-
edy-stripping agreements even appears to be an open question after these reas-
surances and all these years is inexcusable.
IV. INTERNAL ARBITRATION LAW—THE INCREASINGLY
JUDICIALIZED NATURE OF ARBITRATION
It is easy to see how an influx of what I have called “public policy”
cases—disputes between parties with divergent interests of unequal bargaining
power, whether making claims under regulatory statutes or the common law—
puts pressure on the arbitration system to judicialize itself.  Allowing the
stronger contracting party to dictate the dispute resolution procedure is so man-
ifestly unfair that even arbitration true-believers are not completely comfortable
83 See Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 451 (“Under the terms of the parties’ contracts, the question—
whether the agreement forbids class arbitration—is for the arbitrator to decide.”); Book, 538
U.S. at 405-07 (“Respondents insist, and the District Court agreed, that these provisions
preclude an arbitrator from awarding treble damages under RICO.  We think that neither our
precedents nor the ambiguous terms of the contracts make this clear. . . .  In short, since we
do not know how the arbitrator will construe the remedial limitations, the questions whether
they render the parties’ agreements unenforceable and whether it is for courts or arbitrators
to decide enforceability in the first instance are unusually abstract.  As in Vimar, the proper
course is to compel arbitration.” (citation omitted)).
84 Book, 538 U.S. at 404.
85 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
86 Id. at 637 n.19.
87 See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001); Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
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with this aspect of mandatory arbitration.  An obvious strategy for accommo-
dating oneself to this unfairness is to reassert procedural safeguards in the arbi-
tration itself.  The moves have been consistent and predictable:88  Mandatory
arbitration has become increasingly judicialized to deal with the unfairness in
imposing arbitration in the first place.  Judicialization takes two forms—the
increased insertion of law, in the form of more litigation-like procedures and
substantive rules of decision, and increased pressure to make arbitrators more
like judges.
The basic template for judicialized arbitration was set forth in Cole v.
Burns International Security Services,89 which construed the Mitsubishi-Gil-
mer guarantee of preservation of substantive statutory rights to include impor-
tant procedural rights.  According to the Cole opinion, “Gilmer cannot be read
as holding that an arbitration agreement is enforceable no matter what rights it
waives or what burdens it imposes,” and an enforceable mandatory-arbitration
agreement should provide at minimum for (1) a neutral arbitrator; (2) more than
minimal discovery; (3) a reasoned, written award; (4) full statutory remedies
that would otherwise be available in court; (5) no burden on the employee to
pay either unreasonable costs or any arbitrators’ fees or expenses; and (6)
meaningful judicial review.90  A requirement that arbitrators adhere to the
applicable substantive law—a feature departing somewhat from the arbitral tra-
dition of legal informality—is implicit throughout Cole.
The two leading arbitration providers, AAA and Judicial Arbitration and
Mediation Services (“JAMS”), have made moves in these directions.  AAA has
promulgated two separate “Due Process Protocols” for employment and con-
sumer disputes, respectively, which call for an impartial arbitrator with legal
training, application of substantive law, and pre-hearing access to information
for the claimant.91  AAA and JAMS rules for arbitrating employment cases
now require a written, reasoned award and make limited provision for discov-
ery.92  The judicializing thrust of these moves should not be overstated.  The
providers recognize the tension between satisfying the demands of their corpo-
rate defendant customers to keep arbitration simple and cheap, and responding
to pressure from the plaintiffs’ bar, courts, and external regulators for more
88 See, e.g., Edward Brunet & Jennifer J. Johnson, Substantive Fairness in Securities Arbi-
tration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
89 Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
90 Id. at 1482.
91 AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, RESOLVING EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES:  A PRACTICAL GUIDE app.
II, at 18-23 (2006), available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=4426; AM. ARBITRATION
ASS’N, CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL (1998), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?
id=22019.  AAA states that it will decline to administer an arbitration under a contract
whose procedural terms “substantially and materially deviate[ ] from at least the minimum of
th[e Protocol’s] standards.” RESOLVING EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES, supra, at 6.
92 AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCE-
DURES §§ 9, 39(c) (2005), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28481; JUDICIAL ARBI-
TRATION & MEDIATION SERVS., JAMS EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES AND PROCEDURES
R. 18, 24 (2007), available at http://www.jamsadr.com/rules/employment_arbitration_Rules.
asp.  The AAA’s provisions on these matters for consumer disputes are vague and aspira-
tional. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER-RELATED DISPUTES SUPPLEMENTARY PRO-
CEDURES (2005), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22014; AM. ARBITRATION
ASS’N, CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL.
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procedural safeguards.  Thus the providers’ allowances for discovery remain
somewhat grudging—the discovery provisions are highly discretionary with the
arbitrator, raising an interesting empirical question as to how much discovery is
permitted in arbitration practice.
But the pressure on arbitration providers to self-regulate by judicializing
their processes is not likely to go away.  Although Cole has been followed in
only two other jurisdictions,93 many of its concepts have begun to be taken up
in legislative proposals.94
Limited judicial review is—and arguably should continue to be—a defin-
ing feature of arbitration.95  Arbitration providers recognize that this is a key
feature of the appeal of arbitration, and even the highly-touted AAA Due Pro-
cess Protocols resist increasing the scope of judicial review.  But many accom-
modationist advocates of procedural reform are dissatisfied with the extremely
limited scope of judicial review of arbitration awards.96  Again, Cole makes
expanded judicial review a cornerstone of mandatory arbitration in Title VII
cases, and a pending Senate bill would amend the FAA to provide for expanded
judicial review, allowing a district court to vacate an arbitration award for any
non-harmless error shown by a “clear and convincing” standard.97
Finally, we see an increasing number of regulations, both prescriptive and
binding, of arbitrators themselves.  Again, the arbitration providers increasingly
require arbitrators with training or experience in particular areas of substantive
law.  The ABA has issued a cannon of arbitrator ethics, parallel to its cannon of
judicial ethics, and legislative proposals regulating arbitrator ethics and ensur-
ing arbitrator impartiality are on the rise.98
It would be an overstatement to say that arbitration is moving toward a
complete convergence with litigation.  However, it is clear that forcing public
policy into the mandatory arbitration system has created a much more judicial-
ized system of arbitration than what was contemplated by the FAA in 1925.  It
is not unlikely that internal arbitration law will gain in density and complex-
ity—both from external pressure and regulation, and from self-regulation by
arbitrator providers—beyond the current picture.
93 See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000); Rembert
v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 596 N.W.2d 208 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
94 The Fair Arbitration Act of 2007 proposed by Senator Jeff Sessions of Alabama would
amend the FAA to codify similar requirements for written awards and prehearing discovery.
Fair Arbitration Act of 2007, S. 1135, 110th Cong. (2007).
95 Schmitz, supra note 12, at 125-26.
96 See Christopher R. Drahozal, Codifying Manifest Disregard, 8 NEV. L.J. 234 (2007).
97 See Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997); S. 1135.
98 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.85 (West 2007); CAL. CT. R., ETHICS STANDARDS FOR
NEUTRAL ARBITRATORS IN CONTRACTUAL ARBITRATION (2002); S. 1135 § 2 (requiring that
arbitrators be active members of a state bar subject to the ABA Code of Ethics for Arbitra-
tors in Commercial Disputes); ABA, CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL
DISPUTES (2004), available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=4582; see also Maureen A.
Weston, Preserving the Federal Arbitration Act by Reining in Judicial Expansion and
Mandatory Use, 8 NEV. L.J. 385 (2007); Maureen A. Weston, Reexamining Arbitral Immu-
nity in an Age of Mandatory and Professional Arbitration, 88 MINN. L. REV. 449, 456-58
(2004).
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V. THE DISTORTING EFFECT OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
The Arbitration Trilogy has reverberated within the legal academy, creat-
ing a new field of academic inquiry.  As FAA case law has proliferated, so
have scholarly publications on arbitration.  An obscure area generating a small
handful of published scholarly articles at the beginning of the 1980s, arbitration
scholarship has boomed:  The 300-400 articles on arbitration now published
annually in the pages of the journals included within the Westlaw database
represent a fivefold increase in arbitration articles relative to published legal
scholarship generally.99  There are now several casebooks—betokening the
existence of numerous law school courses—devoted largely, or entirely, to
FAA-type arbitration.100  Having myself published five articles, thereby mak-
ing my pre-tenure academic career by commenting on the FAA, I may be biting
the hand that has fed me when I say that I question whether this body of schol-
arship has served the public well.
Legal scholarship might be said to have two functions:  to increase our
knowledge and understanding of the law and legal institutions, and to shape
their development.  I do not for a moment question the quality of the work
produced by my colleagues in academia in increasing our knowledge and
understanding of the doctrine and functioning of arbitration under the FAA.
But I fear that our influence on the development of arbitration law—if we have
had any influence101—is distorted by the prism of the legal academic enterprise
itself.  Scholarly careers are subject to strong path dependence:  An academic
who is moved to publish an initial commentary on a subject has a strong inter-
est in publishing further commentary on the same subject since careers are
made by “streams” of scholarship and the building of reputation and expertise
within a field.  A peculiarity about FAA scholarship seems to be that “big pic-
ture” questions are few.  In fact, I believe there are only two big picture ques-
tions:  Was the Supreme Court right or wrong in making its two fundamental
choices in the arbitration trilogy that the FAA compels public policy claims
into arbitration and preempts state law?  Indeed, perhaps the only big question
is whether one approves or disapproves of mandatory arbitration.  Everything
else is details and nuances.
This particular structure to FAA scholarship pushes academics in a single
general direction, one in which we are—willingly and wittingly, or not—gener-
ally supportive of the institution of mandatory arbitration.  Few of us who have
weighed in on the big question—thumbs up or thumbs down (or some
“nuanced” variant of that)—find that there is more than one or two articles
worth to say on it.  Instead, we turn to commentary on detailed applications and
extensions of the FAA and arbitration law.102  What we cannot do as scholars is
99 See Appendix A.  Again, caveats are in order.
100 See, e.g., ALAN SCOTT RAU, ET AL., ARBITRATION (3d ed. 2006); KATHERINE VAN
WEZEL STONE, ARBITRATION Law (2002); KATHERINE VAN WEZEL STONE, PRIVATE JUS-
TICE:  THE LAW OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2000).
101 It is always open to question whether academic commentators have as much influence
over the thinking of legal actors as we hope we do.
102 Alternatively, arbitration scholars are beginning to turn to empirical studies.  While these
hold out great potential for increasing our understanding of the real world of arbitration, I am
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keep repeating our arguments on the big picture question—fundamental objec-
tions to the whole FAA enterprise, or fundamental approval—because doing so
reduces us to irrelevance in the current array of court battles over the “small
strokes” issues and makes us look foolish to our academic peers.
The problem is that writing about the “current” judicial controversies in
arbitration doctrine, and teaching the doctrine as a stand-alone course, takes as
its starting point that the Second Trilogy—right or wrong—is here to stay.
Arbitration supporters, of course, think that is a good thing.  The rest of us
either reluctantly, or in many cases enthusiastically, accommodate ourselves to
this “reality.”  This accommodationist outlook may be reinforced by our inter-
est as academics in perpetuating a field of teaching and scholarship.  If, as I
believe is right, the Supreme Court (inconceivably) or Congress (possibly)
were to overrule the Second Trilogy, and thereby in one fell swoop throw out
most of the FAA interpretive case law of the last quarter century, many of us
would have to find something else to write and teach about.
CONCLUSION:  TIME TO OVERRULE THE TRILOGY
For every issue that becomes settled in arbitration law, several questions
crop up.  And in fact very few issues in arbitration law ever become settled.
Rather than building a dispute-resolution institution that is a fast and certain
case-referral, the courts have created a complex web of doctrine surrounding
the institution of arbitration, one that generates litigation before and after arbi-
tration decisions.
As a law-clarifying institution, the Supreme Court has performed wretch-
edly since the mid-1980s on arbitration questions.  Having created this long list
of perplexing doctrinal questions with the Second Trilogy, the Court should by
rights have asserted some leadership in clearing them up.  But it has not.  The
Court has all too frequently dodged its opportunities to resolve a doctrinal prob-
lem when it comes to arbitration law, opting for case-by-case decisions provid-
ing little precedential guidance.103  This represents a very poor record of
judicial performance, even if one agrees with the Supreme Court’s embrace of
compelled arbitration.  The doctrinal uncertainty fostered by the Supreme Court
generates a great deal of satellite litigation on enforcement of arbitration, con-
highly skeptical of their capacity to help much in resolving the big picture debate. See
Schwartz, supra note 8.
103 As seen above, the Court has sidestepped several pressing and squarely-presented issues
by the tactic of construing—or remanding to the arbitrator to interpret—some specific bit of
contract language. See supra text accompanying notes 62-63, 67-70, 82-87; see also Green
Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (opting for case-by-case adjudication
of claims that high arbitration costs deter claimants from enforcing federal statutory rights);
Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998) (construing collective bargaining
agreement to avoid deciding the question presented, whether a union can waive its members
right to take federal civil rights claims to court).  Finally, the Court has never clarified the
scope of judicial review of errors of law in arbitration awards:  The controlling principle is
“manifest disregard” of the law, a phrase from an overruled 1953 case, Wilko v. Swan, that
has been strangely construed by the lower courts.  346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953). See, e.g.,
Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1990) (only if it is clear from the face of
the record that the arbitrator “recognized the applicable law—and then ignored it,” will the
award be vacated for “manifest disregard”); Drahozal, supra note 96.
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trary to the Court’s stated goals of promoting a speedy and efficient alternative
to litigation.
It has become crystal clear that the courts cannot or will not correct their
errors in interpreting the FAA; only Congress can do that now.  Mandatory
arbitration gets many cases out of the court system and is therefore too attrac-
tive to judges for them to give it up voluntarily.  The Supreme Court has reaf-
firmed its erroneous decisions too many times, and stare decisis—the rule that
the Court will normally adhere to its precedents, particularly in statutory inter-
pretation cases—is an important factor.104  Nor does the current Court majority
see that an error has been made.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly cited the
lack of congressional action to limit the reach of the FAA as a justification for
declining to reconsider its position.105  Justice O’Connor expressly observed
that “[i]t remains now for Congress to correct” the Supreme Court’s interpreta-
tion of the FAA.106
The proper course is to amend the FAA to overrule the Supreme Court by
removing consumer and employee contracts from the coverage of the statute
and by providing that pre-dispute arbitration agreements in such contracts will
not be enforced.107  The specialized body of unconscionability doctrine; the
incoherent and constitutionally suspect preemption doctrine; the nagging doc-
trinal questions about class actions, remedy-stripping, and forum selection that
the Supreme Court declines to answer year after year; the confused and confus-
ing case-law about which issues are decided by the court and which by the
arbitrator; questions regarding the legal status of arbitration providers, the
AAA’s “due process protocol,” and arbitrator ethics; and a host of other ques-
tions would all be much less important, if not fade into insignificance, if the
FAA were amended to overrule Moses H. Cone, Southland, and Mitsubishi.  In
addition to the increased fairness to consumers and employees, the classical
virtues of arbitration are much more likely to survive the judicializing impact of
mandatory arbitration.
104 See Schwartz, supra note 46, at 45.
105 See, e.g., Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 535 U.S. 105, 122 (2001) (“Congress has not
moved to overturn” the Southland decision); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513
U.S. 265, 272 (1995).
106 Dobson, 513 U.S. at 284 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
107 Pending House and Senate versions of the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007 would
amend the FAA, not only to overrule Mitsubishi and restore the public policy exception, but
more broadly to make pre-dispute arbitration agreements unenforceable in consumer,
employment, and franchise contracts. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th
Cong. § 4 (2007); H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007).  The bill explicitly rejects the judi-
cially-developed notion that arbitration contracts are more enforceable than contracts gener-
ally.  S. 1782 § 4.  It would also overrule the “severability rule” of Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967), and Buckeye Check Cashing,
Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006), which enforce arbitration agreements in otherwise
void contracts.  S. 1782 § 4.  To see how the FAA would look if these amendments were
enacted, see Appendix B.
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APPENDIX A
THE GROWTH OF ARBITRATION LAW
















Figure 1 reflects the growth in the number of FAA-related cases in the
federal courts since the Moses H. Cone decision.  The hashmarked line charts
arbitration cases as a year-by-year percentage of total federal decisions, and the
dashed line charts the cumulative total of arbitration decisions as a percentage
of the cumulative total of federal decisions.  The latter data is pertinent insofar
as the “size” of a body of decisional law is a cumulative rather than a yearly
phenomenon.
There were 70 arbitration decisions in 1982 compared to 729 in 2006.
Part of this tenfold increase would merely reflect the overall numerical growth
of federal decisions, due both to increasing judicial activity and to editorial
expansion of the Westlaw database.  To eliminate that factor, I express the data
as percentages of federal totals, rather than raw numbers of arbitration
decisions.
The cases are those found through a Westlaw search for the terms “‘fed-
eral arbitration act’ or ‘united states arbitration act,’” the two alternative names
for the statute.  While this search may yield cases that merely mention the FAA
tangentially, there is no reason to suppose that such cases have increased at a
greater rate than cases in which the FAA supplies a rule of decision.
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Figure 2 reflects the growth in the number of FAA-related articles in the
Westlaw law review database since the Moses H. Cone decision.  The dashed
line charts arbitration articles as a year-by-year percentage of total articles.
Again, since increases both in overall publication rates and in the scope of the
Westlaw publication database would account for some increase in raw numbers
of articles (5 in 1982 compared to 445 in 2002), I express the data in terms of
percentage rather than raw numbers.
The numbers were generated by searching the same text string, “‘federal
arbitration act’ or ‘united states arbitration act,’” in the Westlaw law review
database.  The search was limited to the title and abstract segments, to exclude
articles that merely mention the FAA tangentially.
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APPENDIX B
SECTIONS 1 AND 2 OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT, AS
AMENDED BY THE ARBITRATION
FAIRNESS ACT OF 2007
(Deletions are in strikeout; additions are in bold.)
§ 1. Definitions “Maritime transactions” and “commerce” defined;
exceptions to operation of title
As used in this chapter—
(1) “maritime transactions,” as herein defined, means charter par-
ties, bills of lading of water carriers, agreements relating to wharf-
age, supplies furnished vessels or repairs to vessels, collisions, or
any other matters in foreign commerce which, if the subject of
controversy, would be embraced within admiralty jurisdiction;
(2) “commerce,” as herein defined, means commerce among the
several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the
United States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such
Territory and another, or between any such Territory and any State
or foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia and any
State or Territory or foreign nation, but nothing herein contained
shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce.;
(3) “employment dispute,” as herein defined, means a dispute
between an employer and employee arising out of the relation-
ship of employer and employee as defined by the Fair Labor
Standards Act;
(4) “consumer dispute,” as herein defined, means a dispute
between a person other than an organization who seeks or
acquires real or personal property, services, money, or credit
for personal, family, or household purposes and the seller or
provider of such property, services, money, or credit;
(5) “franchise dispute,” as herein defined, means a dispute
between a franchisor and franchisee arising out of or relating
to contract or agreement by which—
(A) a franchisee is granted the right to engage in the busi-
ness of offering, selling, or distributing goods or services
under a marketing plan or system prescribed in substan-
tial part by a franchisor;
(B) the operation of the franchisee’s business pursuant to
such plan or system is substantially associated with the
franchisor’s trademark, service mark, trade name, logo-
type, advertising, or other commercial symbol designating
the franchisor or its affiliate; and
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(C) the franchisee is required to pay, directly or indi-
rectly, a franchise fee; and
(6) “pre-dispute arbitration agreement,” as herein defined,
means any agreement to arbitrate disputes that had not yet
arisen at the time of the making of the agreement.
§ 2. Validity, irrevocability, and enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate and enforceability
(a) A written provision in any maritime transaction or a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of
such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the
whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to
submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of
such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrev-
ocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract to the
same extent as contracts generally, except as otherwise
provided in this title.
(b) No predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid
or enforceable if it requires arbitration of—
(1) an employment, consumer, or franchise dispute;
or
(2) a dispute arising under any statute intended to
protect civil rights or to regulate contracts or trans-
actions between parties of unequal bargaining
power.
(c) An issue as to whether this chapter applies to an
arbitration agreement shall be determined by Federal
law.  Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the
validity or enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate
shall be determined by the court, rather than the arbi-
trator, irrespective of whether the party resisting arbi-
tration challenges the arbitration agreement specifically
or in conjunction with other terms of the contract con-
taining such agreement.
(d) Nothing in this chapter shall apply to any arbitra-
tion provision in a collective bargaining agreement.
